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Labor discipline is a key question in the contemporary history of 
Central Eastern Europe. According to domestic mass média of 
communication, however, "undisciplined" work appears to be causing a 
nearly insoluble problem only in socialist societies although 
mangerial control over and punishment of workforce behavior are coeval 
with modern industrial societies.
In this study we present the historical metamorphoses of control 
over the industrial work force, while attempting a summary of 
Hungárián experience on the basis of early and more recent research 
results.
Types of Disciplinary Measures in Capitalist Work Orqanization
In Hungárián society the view persists that order and discipline 
prevail in capitalist firms under the threat of unemployment fór 
workers. This leads somé people to conclude that introduction of 
unemployment would and should be the remedy fór poor labor discipline 
in Hungary as well.
The assumption that such a link exists between labor discipline and 
unemployment is a holdover from the ideological world view of the 
1950s (Gyekiczky, 1984). Its reality is challenged by the history of 
capitalist work organization, by the variety of regulatory forms and 
techniques which capitalist enterprise management employed and still 
employs to secure workshop discipline.
"Panoptic" Labor Discipline (term borrowed from Gaudemar, 1982)
The emergence of modern manufacturing industry was accompanied by 
the question of how to instill a cooperative spirit in workers doing 
specific jobs at a given piacé of work. N
When industrial work organization was born, the rules of intra-firm 
competition were patterned on pre-existing social institutions. These 
rules were based on norms of conduct governing the family, the army 
and penitentiary institutions.
Jeremy Bentham, fór example, saw guarantees fór a cooperative 
attitűdé on the part of industrial workers in the generál transparency 
of work tasks, in control exercised at any moment, and in organization 
of constant and invisible supervision (Bentham, 1797). He alsó 
referred to "combination of interests and duties" as a desideratum.
In a contemporary book one can read that order, cleanliness, 
silence and supervision, with primary emphasis on order, were the 
shopfloor slogans of industrialization gaining momentum in the early 
18th century, because ” . . .  order is the basis of any prosperity. . . 
owner to follow reminds one of the role of a father. What Bergerey 
proposed was explicitly paternalistic behavior, the owner having to 
win prestige, to be well-intentioned towards bút strict with his 
workers, so as to ensure that he was both liked and feared by his mén.
Though internál regulations of firms at that time were far from
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uniform in respect to penalties (they may appear rather Occidental and 
improvised to tho modern mind) incidents emerged of behavior entolling 
the application of sonctions. Incidents considered as such were mainly 
drinking and damage to firm property, as well as rough jokes and foul 
language.
The "Factorv Town" Model as on Extenslve Form of Labor Disclpllne
The "factory town” model as a form of discipline boils down to an
attempt by the mill owner to make the environment surrounding a 
factory, where internál regulations were nőt automatically obserued, 
factory-centered.
This form of discipline grew out of the paternalistic concept of 
employer-employee relationships. The paternalistic owner looked after 
his subordinates and workers outside the factory gates as well as
within them. He devised rules similar to the factory’s internál
regulations to govern the residential areas (Gaudemar, 1982). Within 
the confines of the "town" several elements of social concern
prevailed (pension pay-offices and provision of schooling fór family 
members), coupled with many restrictions (among other things, under a 
certain age only single people were employed in the factory, and those
guilty of "illegal childbirth" had to leave both the factory and the
residential area).
The "factory town" concept rested on the recognition that workers
did nőt observe management’s disciplinary and other rules except
through subjective Identification with them (Gaudemar, t1982). Control 
extending to the worker’s family was meant to promote such 
identification, relying on the primary role of the family in 
assimilating the norms of social cooperation.
At the beginning of the 19th century, the existing set of social 
conditions fór discipline practices was favorable to adaptation to the 
intra-firm environment.
In connection with this set of conditions we do nőt have in mind 
application of piecework wages. Competition which that wage system 
induced between workers tended to erode intrafirm cooperation, so this 
form of wage payment had contradictory effects and generated social 
strains from the moment of its introduction. In 1833, piecework wages 
were paid to only 47 percent of the 67,819 workers at 225 weaving 
mills in the United States.
Drives and propaganda campaigns which were intended to create and 
spread an ethos of obedience and the new order had a much more 
essential effect than that exerted by the form of wage payment on the 
observance of discipline (Pollard, 1963). Thus, fór instance, a 
countrywide campaign agalnst alcohollsm was launched because workers 
and engineers were at times incapacitated from work by excessive 
consumption of alcohol.
Efforts to transform workforce morálé were aimed at reinforcing 
values desirable to industrial work, and at suppressing undesirable 
ones. Undue self-confidence and self-complacency were stygmatized, and 
at the same time increasing emphasis was placed on materiality. An 
important element of creating a new way of life in the domain of 
industrial work was the effort to orgonize the use of leisure, or to 
take various measures to suppress ways of spending money (such as 
excessive consumption of alcohol) which acted to reduce work 
performance.
The main conflicts in the early processes of industrialization 
stemmed from the contradiction between lndustrial and agrarian 
societies. The lndustrial society requlred a different life style and 
thinking in different terms than did agrarian society. It stands to 
reason, therefore, that bourgeois urban culture in the making launched 
a deliberate struggle against rural culture. Since "the traditional 
social habits and norms rarely coincided with the new norms of 
lndustrial life, they were condemned (discredited) as drawbacks of 
progress." (quoted by Pollard, 1965:82, from Harrison, 1950.)
Regulation of time spent in work became a key issue with the 
establishment of modern industrial societies. Nőt only did 
introduction of rational working methods transform society’s view of 
time and space. In the wake of social struggles there alsó emerged the 
concept of length of work time declared as provisions of law (Offe, 
Hinrichs & Wiesenthal, 1983). Accordingly, daily hours of work were 
nőt merely a "technical norm” bút the result of a broad social 
agreement.
Regulation of labor discipline in the 18th and 19th centuries was 
determined, in effect, by a process of industrial adaptation on the 
part of certain groups in traditional society. The requirements of 
adaptation reflected the internál, objective relationships in the 
emerging industrial work organizations, and expectations resulting 
therefrom. This process is clearly manifest in the operation of large 
enterprises. Fór example, in Italy the bureaucratic-military order 
forged a new professional management which did nőt yet exist at the 
time. In this context Butera (198*0 calls attention to the 
contradictions between intra-factory "rationality" and extra-factory 
"irrationality." In the last analysis, the norms of conduct in the new 
society were determined and supported by the whole of culture 
(Thompson, 1973).
However, the other side of this interrelationship (the spread of 
new expectations emerging in the organization of work) is no less 
important. Thus, fór instance, the contradiction between "order" 
inside the firm and "disorder" in society at large was to be resolved 
by the pan-social diffusion of norms evolved inside the firm (Butera,
1984).
The impersonality of industrial work gave rise to the appreciation 
of social achievements and merits, and generalized a rational and 
problem-oriented mentality. The transparency of the division of labor 
was coupled with the development of competence and an awareness of new 
types of cooperation on a societal scale. Punctuality, now at the apex 
of humán values, revamped the hierachy of values of the personality, 
just as social respect fór property resulted from the recognltion won 
fór the prestige of enterprise property.
The "Mechanized Workshop" Concept
The "mechanized workshop" model of regulation of labor discipline 
came about under the impact of social conditions radically different 
from those which had called intő being the other two models discussed 
above. This concept resulted from a scientific organization of work 
and embraced all the innovations which Taylorism introduced intő 
industrial work organization.
Control over cooperation, necessary in the labor process, was taken 
over by the requirements of mechanical-technical processes. This
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eliminated the subjective methods of direction and management based on 
the constant presence of managers. The standardlzation of the woge 
system was an equally important aspect. Economic and technical control 
was thus interwoven in the organization of the Taylorian workshop.
The methods of control introduced were legitimi?ed nőt only by the 
ideology of reliance on Science, bút alsó by the social partners 
concerned. The result was a higher degree of adaptation. The idea and 
practice of management based on personal prestige was strongly shaken, 
though nőt completely destroyed, by Taylorism.
Nevertheless, Taylor’s attempts to bring about a disciplined 
workshop, where workers found it paid to observe discipline and 
therefore worked efficiently without supervision, were accompanied by 
a series of social strains (Coriat, 1979).
The "Democratic Workshop" Concept, or Contractual Discipline
In Germany a surprising study was published in 1900, one that 
stated the case fór abolition of despotic conditions in workshops, fór 
starting political shifts within factories to replace arbitrary 
management with constitutional governance, fór setting up intra-firm 
parliaments whose members were to be elected in part by workers and in 
part by proprietors (Feese, 1900).
In the background of the democratic workshop concept was a need to 
eliminate conflicts as well as maintaining order and discipline. The 
idea of removing conflicts seemed absurd when the institutional system 
of society was incapoble of influencing even social conflicts. The 
democratic workshop, or contractual disciplining, spared employers a 
good deal of the burdens of disciplining and organizing production. 
This enabled them to concentrate more attention on coping with 
financial and commerical business. In establishing such practices, the 
trade unions' acceptance of a new type of social task (Gaudemar, 1982) 
was as essential as the extension of the capitalist State's rule- 
making activity to labor-management relations. The operation of this 
model was conditional on the trade unions accepting a role in the 
disciplining of workers, more specifically in resolving conflict
between Capital and wage work, thereby securing the continuity of
production. At the same time it was necessary to make provision fór
control over the observance of legal guarantees (Ministere de 
l ’Interieur, 1983). Consequently, trade unión activity was to be of 
advantage to both labor and management.
Present-day literature reflects in generál a rather favorable view 
of the spread of employment relations based on a new consensus between 
management and labor, claiming it to represent the desirable trend of 
development. A favorable impact on cooperation is emphasized in the
first piacé.
"If strikes and revolutionary turbulence are to be avoided, in one 
word, if ills are to be cured at their roots, the legitimate motives 
of labor discontent must be eliminated as fást as possible.
Cooperation, or workers’ share in the proprietor’s profit, is the only 
means of achieving the desired result . . . ." (Ministere de
l’Interieur, 1983:12)
However, caution in this respect is advised by historical
experience. The aforementioned main types of discipline employed by 
capitalist enterprises did nőt, with their emergence, do away with
formerly dominant forms of discipline. Examples of such survivals are
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provided by the operation of Industrial enterprises today. Certain 
approaches do nőt exclude others, since conditions molded by the 
social environment and the requirement of efficiency both coll fór 
parallel application of various disciplining procedures. This brief 
survey of types goes to show alsó that the norms of conduct and the 
values characteristic of the world of capitalist firms did nőt become 
securely established overnight. Evén a long process of historical 
development failed to find a definitive solution fór all the problems 
of discipline.
The fact that the struggle against infringements of discipline is 
still being waged, despite centuries-old persistent efforts by 
capitalist management, is a clear indication that the roots of 
conflict in capitalist firms are entrenched nőt only in the factors 
and conditions repeatedly subjected to attempts at regulation, bút in 
the very structure of the industrial mode of production, the 
contradictions of which cannot be eliminated by a mere regulation of 
social relations in the workshop.
At the same time one should nőt underestimate the results achieved 
by the regulation of intro-firm conflicts over the pást 100 to 150 
years. Although it was impossible to attain the social goal of 
regulatory endeavors (to eliminate conflicts) the renewed efforts are 
clear evidence of the possibility of organizing humán cooperation and 
collaboration even under a set of social relations that are permeated 
with the antagonism existing between wage-work and Capital.
Deterloratlon of Labor Discipline. 
or Crisis of the Capitalist Work Orqanization
It is generally held that the capitalist labor process is currently 
in crisis. Mony see the relaxation of labor discipline as the root 
cause of the crisis (Dubois, 1958; Pollard, 1965). This is ultimately 
generated by the erosion of the traditional political and morál norms 
legitimating social prestige. In providing an explanation, these 
people call attention to the increased demands on labor, changes in 
the age-pattern (a growing ratio of young persons) among the gainfully 
occupied, and the socio-organizational implications of microelectronic 
innovations.
The labor process is one of cooperation, the participants in which 
(workers, enterprise management and social guidance) play their 
mutually supplementary roles in the intertwining zone of consensus and 
conflict, within glven frameworks of continuous organlzational 
functioning as conditioned by the transmission of social relations 
(Makó, 1985). Accordingly, historically changing forms of control 
emanating from power are essentlal elements of the labor process, 
understood to be a form of cooperation among people (Gaudemar, 1982).
Punishment intended as a means of discipline represents a social 
force only when exercised as legitimate power. Hence management has to 
win support of social guidance fór the exercise of power outside the 
enterprise, as well. The relationship between the two spheres can be 
interpreted as moving between the extremes of support and 
confrontation.
The main form of power in capitalist firms is managerial control 
over labor and lower management, bút historical types of the 
capitalist labor process include control by one group of workers over 
another (Makó, 1985).
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Under industrial social conditions, involvement in the exercise of 
various forms of power is through social strains due to the division 
of labor and specialization (among other things). Cooperation in the 
labor process is a priori injected with conflicts by the diversity of 
interests accompanying the different llnes of work, bút alsó promoting 
the emergence of fresh forms of cooperation.
Given the prevailing pattern of the division of labor and the 
frameworks of power based on it, labor discipline is the most suitable 
factor fór ensuring cooperation. Xts acceptance is the key to the 
norms framed in a given organizational hierarchy on the one hand, and 
to the success of organizational cooperation on the other (Makó,
1985). Any shift in the balance of power and social consensus is 
therefore manifest in the quality and State of labor discipline as 
well.
The participants in the labor process (mainly workers) react to 
shifts in institutionally established frameworks with active rather 
than passive adjustments. Their activity aims to change the social 
conditions of the labor process. Their reactions depend partly on 
their social contentment at the macro and mlcro levels, partly on the 
means of interest mediation as learned from previous generations of 
workers and refined by them. These individual and collective actions 
by workers in turn trigger managerial responses changing with the 
course of history, bút always retaining a common feature. Capitalist 
management has responded to collective actions more sharply and more 
vigorously than to individual resistance (dismissals consequent on 
wildcat strikes— Gershuny, 1973).
Taylorism and Fordism operated to give promlnence to technological 
control, and to overshadow the "visible” system of power institutions. 
The technical system of production came to play a growing role in 
shaping patterns of work organization and cooperative relations, as 
well as in devising the forms of cooperation and consensus (Gaudemar, 
1982). The different skills necessary fór the operation of a 
particular technology and their monopolization, as well as the extent 
of participation in technological processes, tended to produce unequal 
workforce posltions. These entailed differentlatlon in the punishment 
strategy of capitalist management. In the case of groups of workers 
with rare and special skills, there is a tendency fór changes to occur 
in hierarchical and power relationships. Management’s dependence on 
support from such groups of workers is greater than the dependence of 
such groups on management.
In point of fact, capitalist management never has employed a 
uniform strategy fór disciplining. It allowed certain groups and 
segments of workers a notable degree of independence with a view to 
enhancing the efficiency of use-value production, using mainly 
incentive and rewarding techniques in influencing their behavior. Bút 
it showed no particular "understanding" towards workers in weak 
positions in the labor process and the labor markét, applying against 
them the harshest and most demonstratíve forms of discipline possible. 
It should be added that the means of discipline or punishment, and 
reward or stimulatlon, cannot always be separated. Fór instance, 
piecework wages serve both to stimulate workers (causing them to 
increase their participation) and to discipline them by way of 
economlc pressure.
The process of social change has radically reshaped the conditions 
fór and the forms of social control over manpower. In 1937, fór
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lnstance, the extra-firm behavior of workers at the Ford Works was 
controlled by the priváté police of the Works. A worker who neglected 
his household had reason to fear dismissal. Leading a life 
objectionable to management could mean pay cuts and loss of bonuses.
By contrast, in the second part of the 1960s, extra-firm control of 
manpower was exercised by institutions which formulated objects and 
values of life in a welfare society. Intra-firm control was secured by 
trade unions and the objectlve frameworks of work schedules as defined 
by technological requlrements.
However, in spite of such fai— reaching social changes, there is no 
essential difference between the present-day forms of work force 
behavior subject to disciplinary penalties, and those of 150 years 
ago. This, too, goes to show that patterns of behavior inside the work 
organization, forms and types of work force conduct, have far deeper 
roots in the fundamental relations of industrial society (which is 
operating the work organization) than would allow scope fór the 
application of any concrete procedure to solve definitively the 
problems of discipline.
Hungárián Experience
Labor discipline was given great emphasis in the rhetoric of the 
political leadership and in propaganda materials after the economic 
reform in Hungary in the 1960s. While countrywide campaigns seemed to 
work themselves out by the 1970s, labor discipline remained an 
evergreen aspect of political public life.
The political commltment to strengthen labor discipline is an 
essential feature of practice in socialist societies. In the countries 
of central-eastern Europe, in contrast to capitalist societies, social 
representation of norms and values of humán cooperation in work alsó 
is coordlnated by State intervention (Bihari, 1985; Kulcsár, 1980).
Since, however, the institutions of state intervention were nőt 
adjusted to reál social relations, particularly in the first years of 
the industrialization drive, they provided a background fór a 
rearrangement of norms and values independent of political endeavors 
(Kulcsár, 1980).
Campaigns fór Labor Discipline
The hlstory of the pást 40 years recorded three intensive 
campaigns, deliberately launched by the political leadership, to 
improve labor discipline. The first was carried on in 1951-52, the ’ k 
second in 1964-65, and the third started in the mid-1980s.
All three campaigns coincided with economic troubles, the 
sharpening of efficiency problems and stagnation of reál wages. 
Although the concrete causes of economic ills differed by perlőd 
(Butera, 1984), these campaigns showed several points of slmilarity: 
looking fór scapegoats, attribution of economic difficulties to 
external causes, and a trend to direct use of legal means. The failure 
to make a realistic analysis of the work organization and the labor 
process, and disregard fór the experience already analyzed, were added 
features common to these drives. Finally, ideologies suggestive of a 
fictive image of society were formulated in an effort to legitimize 
the campaigns. The resultant assessment of the situation held that 
workplaces were full of double-crossers and skulkers, that management
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did nőt take sufficiently firm measures against them, ond that the 
burdens were carried by an anonymous majority of honest workers. 
Except in the 1960s, there was little or no talk of interests and 
practically no talk of wages and salaries.
That nőne of the campaigns proved really successful was no 
surprise. According to statistical data, in the early 1950s, fór 
instance, workers continued to leave their places of work and to be 
absent from work without good cause, despite strict penalties. 
Moreover, with the labor markét Corning intő play, even the models of 
loyalty to the enterprise (skilled workers and senior employees) left 
their places of work when better conditions of work or higher pay were 
available elsewhere. In other words, work force bahavior follows rules 
different from those presupposed or suggested in the deliberate 
political campaigns. Fór related research results from the
Sociological Research Institute of the Hungárián Academy of Sciences, 
see Wilklnson (1983).
Under legal regulations in the 1950s, management was free to impose 
disciplinary penalties on undisciplined workers, as provided fór in 
labor legislation. Crimlnal proceedings could be initiated against 
those absent from work without good cause, and those arbitrarily 
leaving employment. Although legislation did nőt provide fór the 
criminal liability of the latter, adverse awards were adjudicated to 
15,000 workers during the two years of the first campaign. Of course,
this figure pales in comparison to the immense mass of direct
disciplinary actions initiated during the period.
The cases of labor discipline at the time were of three main types. 
One involved problems of production. If a factory turnéd out shoddy 
Products and the fact was discovered, the case was closed by punishing 
an employee fór breach of discipline. A second involved lnfringement 
of labor safety regulations. This type made up the majority of 
disciplinary actions in the pre-1952 period. A third type involved 
conflicts within the enterprise power structure arising from rapid 
social change, such as disagreements between the "new" and "old" 
intelligentsia, between the director and his "worker cadre" head of 
department.
The persons brought to disciplinary responsibility in cases of the 
first type were mostly middle-level technical managers and senior 
specialists. Punishment rarely entailed final loss of position, 
because disciplinary judgements were appealed more often than nőt and 
responsibility was shifted to others fór such things as errors in 
planning or in the preparatory process. The second type of cases 
included semi-skilled and skilled workers, middle-level administrative 
employees, unskilled workers, and plánt security guards. Their 
reactions ranged from indifferent acquiescence to vigorous protest. 
The third type of disciplinary cases involved mainly senior personnel 
in high echelons of management.
By contrast, the social composition of workers brought to criminal 
responsibility showed a rather homogenous pattern. Such fates were met 
chiefly by people at a disadvantage in both the social structure and 
the work organization. Characteristically, their social situations 
compelled conflict with regulations concerning the performance of 
work. They had to care fór ill children, to till the land fór their 
old parents to meet compulsory delivery obligations, to do share- 
cropping and threshing in order to support many dependents, and the 
like. As a rule, they did nőt protest against adverse awards even in
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cQses of non-culpabllity. They did nőt appeal agalnst court orders. As 
few as three percent of them filed such appeals.
The foregoing clearly points to a differentiated discipllning 
strategy of management. Less severe action was taken agalnst workers 
with a Central role in the work organization. Stricter and often 
arbitrary measures were taken against those in marginal positions.
Specific Features of the Work Organization Influenclnq Disciplinary 
Practice
Peculiarities of work organizations bear upon disciplinary 
practices in Hungary. (Macroeconomic characteristics lnfluencing 
disciplinary practice will nőt be treated here; they are supposed to 
be known, mainly from Bauer, 1981 and Richard, 190<t.)
Prlmary emphasis should be laid on the significance of the fact 
that the history of industrial work organizations In Hungary did nőt 
produce the forms of work organization reviewed In the first part of 
this study, and characterlstlc of the evolutlon of capitalist 
industrial organizations. Bureaucratic control of operational 
conditions made technologlcally-dictated cooperation among actors In 
the labor process extremely dlfficult, even in work organizations 
subject to technological control. Quasi-bureaucratic work 
organizations emerged, where pre-exlstlng institutional forms proved 
narrow or insufflcient fór managlng conflicts of Interest. These 
phenomena were called lnto being by the impact of several factors 
related to operation of the Hungárián economy and lts character as a 
short-supply economy. Fór lnstance, if capltal-intensive technology is 
operated in labor-lntesive form or lf basic production is streamlined 
by lmported technology bút supporting actlvltles are nőt, resolution 
of the resultlng difficulties of tehnologlcal one-sidedness inevitably 
is attempted by administrative lnterventlon. The frequent failure of 
such recourse to bureaucratic norms leads to an upgradlng of the role 
played in production by certain groups of workers (Makó, 1985:151).
At the same time, narrow frameworks of polltical Interest mediation 
impeded discovery and solution of social conflicts of interest 
generated by lndustrializatlon. As there was no organizatlonal- 
institutional basis fór adjustlng social relations which were 
rearranged in the course of transformatlon, (natural) resistance to 
change had no scope fór manifesting ltself except in 
uninstltutionallzed aspects of humán cooperation, staying partly 
lmprlsoned in the psychlc sphere.
In an effort to fulfil prescribed plán targets, enterprise and
workshop management offered partnership by concludlng internál
agreements prohiblted by the polltical leadership. Bút provlng lts 
compllance with the rules of the legitlmate game, management alsó took 
harsh action agalnst groups of workers whose partial dlsmlssal did nőt 
Jeopardize the production process and who would have left sooner or 
later anyway.
While the polltical leadership pressed fór a repressive solution of 
conflicts in the work organization, by way of labor discipline
campaigns and legal regulatlons, enterprise management lald emphasis 
on cooperation (whlle meeting the demands of politics with respect to 
a certain rangé of workers). lts bargalning posltion vis-a-vis top 
management was dependent on that course of action.
What types of behavior were llkely to provide a basis fór the
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institutlon of legal proceedlngs?
The Labor Code, which covered types of behavior offending labor 
discipline in depth, gave prominence to political motives. Behaviors 
were singled out which "indlcate opposition to the State and social 
order of the people’s democracy." By contrast, enterprise management 
preferred invoking the government decree which predated the Labor 
Code. It provided that wage-fraud, abuse of work clothing, and causing 
unintentional damage were disciplinary offenses. Management insistence 
on the application of this older decree was understandable. Clothing 
of conflicts in political garb would have eroded the rather unstable 
cooperation then in the making and crucial to fulfilment of plán 
targets.
Industrialization naturally called fór populatlon adaptation to the 
requirements of the industrial system. This recognition lay behind the 
still common view that, had it nőt been fór the strict discipline of 
the 1950s, it would have been impossible to bring about the Industrial 
foundations underpinning later development.
Inquiries intő the actual circumstances of the 1950s reveal that a 
number of coercive measures were intended to generate momentum fór the 
flow of the agricultural populatlon intő industry. Bút the harshest 
type of disciplinary penalties were nőt directed merely against this 
group of the populatlon. Forty percent of those subjected to 
disciplinary punishment had been industrial workers before the 1950s. 
Evén the ancestors of thirty perecent of them had been industrial 
workers. To boot, failure to observe internál rules of operation in 
work organizations ranked only 4th or 5th among the causes of conflict 
(Gyekiczky, 1973).
In reality, the adaptation at the time was a political one. 
Measures to ensure it were deslgned to stlfle expression of workers’ 
interests and thereby facilitate adminstratlve manpower management. 
Work force behavior offending against labor discipline accordlngly was 
to be construed as a manifestatlon of a speciflc strategy fór interest 
mediation, depending on exlsting institutional frameworks and values, 
on traditional ways of bargaining, and on the posslbllity of 
assimllatlng them.
We have dwelt on the 1950s, nőt because the disciplinary practlce 
of the perlőd is itself so interesting, bút because any campaign 
launched to establish discipline by Central dlrectlves is consldered a 
survival of the regulatory logic prevailing durlng the 1950s. The 
permanence of that logic under a changed set of soclo-economic 
conditions is, in our view, extremely dangerous socially as well as 
polltlcally.
The change in conditions by the 1960s was most glaringly evident in 
the amendment of legal regulations. Although the labor leglslation of 
the 1960s relntroduced harsh penal measures in accordance with the 
campaign launched at that time, behaviors llable to punishment were 
defined rather broadly as amounting to breach of duty connected with 
employment relations. From the point of view of regulatory practice, 
this meant a Damoclean bane rather than clear guidance on wrongful 
behavior (which is, fór that matter, almost impossible to provide).
When settled, labor law allowed scope fór disciplining of other 
types as well. In effect the rules on labor discipline, modelled as 
they are on penal law, still refer to employment-related duties. They 
refer back to the labor contract, that is to the agreement between 
management and labor. To the extent to which the labor contract rises
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to its reál status, and social conditions are created guaranteeing 
observance of contractual norms fór partles with different power 
status, we may take a step toward one indlspensible prerequisite of 
abandonlng the penal regulation of labor discipline. As long as the 
operation of the work organization is dominated by invlslble rules of 
cooperation and there is no instltutional basis fór conflict 
management and humán cooperation in production, the contractual 
principle naturally wlll fali to come fully intő play. Yet this cannot 
serve as a pretext fór malntainlng paradoxlcal regulation of 
disciplinary offences on the model of penal law.
The disciplinary strategles of the 1980s treated as priváté affairs 
of enterprises are of great variety. They depend on enterprise 
positions in the labor markot, on traditions of the workforce at 
factories and enterprises, on the quallfications of enterprise 
management, on its willingness and ability to accept conflict, and so 
on.
Our inqulries showed no case either of disciplinary action or of 
labor arbitration at somé enterprises fór the pást two or three years. 
We did uncover attempts by service firms to "stimulate" workers by 
disciplinary measures. In comparison with the 1960s there has been a 
greater measure of consensus between enterprise management and workers 
in central positions, which is further strengthened by changes 
initiated in the early 1980s. These lnclude the appearance of lntra- 
enterprise business partnerships (VGMKs), a speclal kind of internál 
subcontractlng known in the industrial practice of capitalist 
countries. Local political and economlc power and speclal skllls are 
elements of the power structure which, organized in varylng ways by 
enterprises, currently control intra-firm disciplinary practices 
(Petho, 1985).
An important fact bearing on behavlor in the course of employment 
is that our economy shows trends of multisectoralism. This alters the 
attitűdé to work. It "rewrites" the hitherto valld work standards and 
values rooted in rural society (Gaudemar, 1982). Dissatisfaction with 
work done under exlstlng conditions and resistance to workplace 
requirements are nőt, in our view, necessarily signs of indlsclpline. 
Partly they lndlcate the lack of reforms that are vitai and 
indlspensible fór puttlng social reproductive processes on a new 
course. In other words, the crlsls of prevaillng modes of cooperation 
should be seen as a manlfestation of a demand fór new types of humán 
cooperation. The crisis of labor discipline should be seen as one of 
the ways in which cooperation is practiced and conflicts are resolved.
Before making closing remarks on the latest developments in 
Hungary, we shall sum up in brief the theoretical substance of the 
foregolng discussion.
Labor Discipline as a Form of Cooperation and Adaptation
Soclologlcally, labor discipline is treated as an element, given 
and indlspensible, of the lndustrial labor process and as a guarantee 
of cooperation taking shape in that process. At the same time, it is a 
form of cooperation between social partners In the labor process, one 
that appears in varlous rules and regulations concernlng interest and 
power relations between workers and management as partners.
Industrial work organization rests on the organlzatlonal separatlon 
of the divlslon of labor, on specializatlon, and on the
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synchronization or coordination in time of lsolated tasKs. The 
interests and aspirations of members in the work organization are 
isolated in a lasting way. lsolated interests and differentiated 
interest relations form the basis fór the centripetal aspirations of 
those cooperating in the labor process. The synchronization of work 
tasks comes about as a result of subduing centrifugai tendencies, of 
applying "techniques" of cooperation which are manifest in continuous 
managerial control over and assessment of isolated tasks. In the 
course of coordination and control aimed at ensuring the continuity of 
production, enterprise management often resorts to incentive methods 
based on the duallty of reward and punishment. The Central element of 
these methods is constituted by the regulation of wages and working 
conditions.
At the same time the labor process is a process of dlstributlon of 
dlverse goods. Changing norms of distributlve relations, changes in 
rewards or punishments fór behavior of the particlpants in the labor 
process (partlcularly workers) thus give rlse to a serles of social 
conflicts. The social institutions regulating such conflicts thereby 
become part and parcel of the regulation of social relations 
surrounding the performance of work.
Cooperation in the labor process should be maintained on a 
continuous basis. The posslbility of doing so is diminished by a 
strategy merely of punishment. Continuous malntenanace of power calls 
fór a relaxatlon of too-strict punltive rules, and differentlal 
treatment of groups of workers formed In the labor process appropriate 
to their weight and actual functlon. Aspirations prohibited fór groups 
nőt sharing In power are perhaps alsó tolerated by a redistribution of 
participation in power (management).
Continuous maintenance of power manifests itself In various social 
institutions of control over the labor process. It extends to those 
outside the factory gate, fór instance to educational establlshments, 
thereby ensuring the reproduction of behavlors required fór the 
performance of work. The social basis of control is constituted by the 
creation and spread of such norms of behavior and such values as are 
needed fór humán cooperation to evolve in the labor process.
The particlpants in the labor process play their soclally 
determlned roles in a particular work organization. The hlerarchlcally 
regulated world of the organization— the institutionalized or vlsible 
form of power— sets up the norms and standards of behavior whose 
assimilatlon may be the clue to successful participation in the labor 
process. The operation of the organization engenders a kind of social 
adaptation, in the presence of which infringement of the 
organization's norms calls lnto play society’s punitive power, which 
Is deemed to be legitimate. (A discussion of different forms of 
legitimacy would go beyond the scope of this study. We note only that 
institutions without social legitimacy exert their effect In response 
to structural pressure. Fór a fuller discussion see Keenoy, 1981.) 
Social acceptance or rejection of punishments deslgned to strengthen 
labor discipline clearly reflect the State of social cooperation in 
the labor process.
The employer’s rlght to mete out punishment lmplies, in any social 
system, the rlght to enforce social adaptation In the labor process. 
If consensus across the social scale becomes corroded, social 
conflicts alsó appear In the work organization in the guise of 
"deteriorating" labor discipline. When society finds itself In a
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crisis situation, this process may become very vigorous. All this alsó 
naturally implies that the new type of social cooperation is bound to 
react upon the norms and standards of labor discipline.
Closinq Remarks on the Latest Developments in Hungary
In concluding our study, we whall comment briefly on the drive fór 
labor discipline which is being launched by a whole series of State 
measures, and furnish somé insight intő its ideological background. 
This drive constitutes the latest development agitating many people.
From behind the efforts at administratively induced improvement of 
labor discipline, there emerges an image of the economy and society 
resembling in many ways that of the 1950s. Thus the socialist system 
might be seen as a unified system of organizations, composed of 
closely interlocking elements which evolve a common pattern of 
workforce behavior everywhere. These behaviors might be described 
using polar categories such as "disciplined/undisciplined" or 
"following norms/violating norms," which would imply that norms are 
clear and uniform everywhere, and transparent fór all.
In fact, the socialist economy did nőt constitute such a united and 
homogenous system even at the moment the relevant theory was born. In 
the early 1950s the structure of work organizations was made 
heterogeneous by small peasant farms and agricultural enterprises, by 
cooperative State farms, and alsó by the artisans’ sector (which was 
always present, albeit initially disguised and later emerging intő the 
open). In the 1980s a new pattern of work organization alsó appeared 
in state industry, often fór the purpose of doing the same jobs 
formerly performed on enterprise time.
Evolving alternatives provided workers somé norms and somé chances 
(such as with respect to use of free time and paid holidays) which 
allowed reformulation of the requirements fór participation in work.
Society is witness to a multi-channel flow of behaviors as well as 
of the norms and values governing them. Norms and stereotypical 
actions which have proven their value in an organization are 
transplanted intő other organizations, guided by a different logic of 
operation. The resultant erosion of organizatlonal norms may easily 
appear to indicate a deterioration of discipline. (Imperfections of 
the organization of full-time work are analyzed by Szmicsek, 1986, in 
light of the operation of VGMKs.)
Developments in the pást few years have undoubtedly cleared the way 
fór a more open manifestation of values. In our view, however, the 
degree of openness is nőt enough fór us to become masters of the 
future. The coming years can be expected to enrich systems of 
organizations bulit on the labor process. Legal recognition of the 
competition of values may be interpreted as a condition necessary bút 
nőt sufficient fór steering the course of the future. To establish a 
pre-existing bút nőt functioning value system as an ideál of
discipline, and to rule out all other values, are equal to reinforcing 
the conservative values of administrative management.
The effects of the full development of the reform process and the 
ensuing momentum of economic growth naturally will be manifest in
changing weights of economic sectors and a reassessment of their
roles. The expected fuller development of the service sector, the 
social organization of a system of exchange and transmission of 
Information, the growing importance of education and training, and the
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like wlll alsó mean expanslon of that sphere of the economy. This will 
call fór an organlzatlonal setup different from that of industry, and 
hence lncapable of followlng the model of the machine industry's
workshop organization, which is adjusted to the demands of
administrative management.
The probable direction of economic development thus will make even 
more anachronistic the largely outworn values and norms which an 
ideological view of society (accompanying the campaign) regards as 
deduced from the "objective world order." The requirements of 
profitability and efficiency call fór a multlformlty of humán 
cooperation In the labor process, and of directlve and managerial
methods fór ensurlng cooperation. The current campaign, however,
demanding as it does generalized norms applicable to all, Is
counterproductive fór this desireable course of development.
A key aspect of development concerns the economic and social 
effects to be produced by the techniques and technologies employed. 
Will the latest high technology conserve or disrupt the exlstlng
hierarchlcal pattern of work organization? Both domestlc and
international experience shows that while the most modern
technological systems can be adjusted to establlshed hierarchlcal 
forms of organization (consider the reequipment of the printing
industry in Hungary) new models of work organization alsó follow In
their wake (Sabel, 1982; Slmonyi, 1986).
Introduction of the latest technological systems tends to produce 
still more contradictory effects on society as a whole. As Is
demonstrated by empirlcal analyses, the appearance of a new technology 
does nőt automatlcally generate actlon and postures in support of 
technological advance. Often it is precisely the groups of. managers 
and workers most directly concerned who protest against the
appllcation of new techniques and technologies. Yet their reactions 
cannot be described and appraised by somé sort of dichotomous, clear 
formula. Such a simplified presentation of social reality does nothing 
bút increase the risk of abortlve action.
New technologies create new capacltles and raise new demands, with 
the people affected cherlshing new asplratlons and mapping out new 
courses of action, formulating new norms that do nőt fit in with the 
traditional forms of cooperation. We wonder if a worker who "argues," 
or relies on his own professional sklll rather than the professional 
competence of management, can and may be declared to be 
"undisciplined." The weight of this questlon cannot bút grow with the 
probable increase in the significance of creativity.
New technologies piacé new requirements upon management as well. 
Certain representatives and occaslonally even groups of managers pút 
up resistance. They impede the development of the lnnovative process 
in order to keep their positions and influence (Wllklnson, 1983). 
Without undertaking an analysis of this question, we conflne ourselves 
to pointing out that different attitudes to new technology are clearly 
lmpossible to interpret in terms of contrasting categories of 
"dlsciplined" and "undisciplined."
Defense of aggregate work time is one of the chief slogans of the 
present-day campaign. By contrast, somé Hungárián researchers refer to 
ten or eleven hours of daily work time, and to an intensity of work 
exceeding the European average (Adler, 1986; Thoma, 1986). Under such 
circumstances, the slogan of defending work time serves in part to 
divert attention from the reál problems encountered In lndustrial and
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non-industrial work in Hungary, and in part to conceal conflicts 
arising out of the lnner loglc of industrial work organization and the 
performance of work manifesting themselves in humán behavior.
The campaign is conducted as if the infrastructure serving the 
population and supporting the system of industrial production—  
kindergarten and school networks, commerce, transport, servlces and so 
on— had been established to a sufficient degree and were functioning 
well. It falls to take intő account the fact that industrial work, 
Involving greater intellectual and physical efforts than any previous 
form of work, can only be done with great expenditure of energy if the 
lnfrastructural facilltles adequately perform their function of 
relieving pressure on workers.
The treatment of time spent in work as a mere technical norm, and 
ensuing Central measures, fali to consider that in societies placlng 
the industrial system In the center of social reproduction, work time 
takes shape in a hlstorlcally conditioned domaln of social agreements, 
Just as wages or the moss of labor legislation do. Again, specifics of 
the diverse arenas of work and lts structural pattern are ignored.
A discussion of numerous important aspects of the campaign fór 
labor discipline would have exceeded the scope of this brlef survey. 
We could nőt present evidence in support of our reservatlons 
concerning the benefits expected to result from efforts by management 
of a producing enterprise, operating at a loss, to stimulate workers 
fór fuller use of work time, so that they turn out an even larger 
volume of unsalable goods. Nor can we bút refér to the machanisms of 
the search fór scapegoats. Bút the foregolng may have indicated our 
posture.
The ills of the Hungárián economy, which have grown acute in the 
1980s, cannot be cured by administrative strengthening of labor 
discipline. Should the country still try to follow that course, it 
might be courting the same fate that befell the surgeon in the story: 
the operation was a success, bút the patient died.
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